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to Stereotypic Crime News
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Abstract
Tests were performed to learn whether exposure to news about crimes committed 
by dark-skinned criminals increases impulsive facial-threat perceptions of meeting 
dark-skinned strangers in a subsequent situation (media-priming hypothesis), but only 
when the facial displays are ambiguous (ambiguity hypothesis). The assumption is 
that news stereotypes prime the “dark-skinned criminal” stereotype, which, in turn, 
influences subsequent face processing. An experiment with two groups was used to 
test this prediction. Participants allocated to the treatment group (n = 53) read about 
crimes committed by dark-skinned criminals. In contrast, for the control group (n = 
52), cues indicating skin color were not mentioned at all. As predicted, the treatment 
increased the perceived facial threat of dark-skinned strangers, but only when the 
facial displays were ambiguous. Given the importance of the face in social interaction, 
I discuss important, real-world implications for recipients as well as for journalists and 
media organizations.
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First impressions of faces are made within a split second (Willis & Todorov, 2006) and 
can have significant social consequences. For example, attractive people typically get 
better outcomes than unattractive people do in almost every important domain of life 
(Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994). In addition, baby-faced individuals are typically less 
likely to receive severe judicial outcomes as opposed to mature-faced individuals 
(Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991), and “cute” baby faces elicit approach and protective 
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responses (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1986). In contrast, angry faces potentiate 
avoidance responses (Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005). Furthermore, there is proof 
that the perception of competence based solely on politicians’ facial appearances can 
predict the outcome of elections (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005): 
Inferences of competence based on a short, one-second exposure to the faces of the 
winners and the runners-up for U.S. Senate races predict the election outcomes.
Taken together, this research shows that an adequate decoding of facial expressions 
in everyday life is very important. The present research investigated the role of expo-
sure to news stereotypes within this perception process. The assumption is that expo-
sure to stereotypic crime news where criminals are repeatedly paired with a specific 
facial attribute can bias this perception process. Building on previous content-analytic 
research that showed that crime news tends to associate specific (minority) groups 
with negative behavior, I hypothesize that exposure to crime news about crimes com-
mitted by dark-skinned criminals increases the perceived facial threat of meeting 
unknown, dark-skinned strangers in a subsequent situation. I assume that news stereo-
types prime the “dark-skinned criminal” stereotype in the recipients’ minds, which, in 
turn, influences subsequent face processing.
The primary contribution this study makes to news stereotype-priming literature is 
two-fold. First, it advances news stereotype research by showing effects on a factor 
which, to date, has not gotten the attention it deserves, but which is nonetheless 
socially extremely important. Imagine that exposure to media stereotypes substan-
tially influences the perception of facial threats. This can have fundamental conse-
quences on individuals and thus on society. The importance of the face in social 
interactions (e.g., everyday life, judicial outcomes, voting behavior) has already been 
mentioned. Second, it advances theory by testing the media-priming effect on different 
levels of ambiguity: I hypothesize that news stereotype priming is observable only for 
faces with ambiguous facial displays.
First, I start with a review of news stereotype-priming research. Next, I theorize a 
link between facial-perception research and media priming. This leads to the develop-
ment of the primary research hypothesis (i.e., the news-exposure effect on impulsive 
facial-threat perceptions). After that, I discuss the boundary conditions of this effect by 
focusing on ambiguity.
News Stereotype Priming
Stories about crime are omnipresent in news coverage. As Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) 
noted, crime news utilizes several attributes for successful news reporting, and 
employs episodic reporting including such things as concrete events with relevance for 
ordinary people, emotion, drama, and attention-getting visuals or words. Although 
there are differences between television news and newspapers (e.g., importance of 
visuals, possibility of re-reads), there are high similarities (see Gilliam & Iyengar, 
2000): Crime news typically provides an orderly and predictable set of scenarios and 
roles. The authors argued that in many cases, expectations are so well developed that 
when recipients encounter “incomplete” stories, they actually fill in “missing” infor-
mation. One important detail of common crime scripts is that specific social categories 
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are overrepresented as offenders. This element of the crime script is the focus of the 
present research. It has been shown that especially historically marginalized social 
categories are typically paired with crime on (local) television news (e.g., Dixon & 
Linz, 2000) or in (tabloid-style) newspapers (e.g., Arendt, 2010). Such a basic news 
bias pertaining to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination has been revealed in 
several countries such as Germany (Ruhrmann & Songül, 2000), the United States 
(Dixon & Linz, 2000), Austria (Arendt, 2010), and the Netherlands (Vergeer, Lubbers, 
& Scheepers, 2000).
The consequence of exposure is that “the news may create or cause cognitive asso-
ciations” (Oliver & Fonash, 2002, p. 138) between crime and historically marginalized 
groups. I use an implicit social-cognition model of media priming as the theoretical 
framework to explain such effects (Arendt, 2013a). Stereotypes are conceptualized as 
cognitive associations that consist of a concept representing a social category and an 
attribute (Greenwald et al., 2002). Attributes included within stereotypes refer to attri-
butes that individuals believe characterize an entire social group. Thus, the use of 
stereotypes can keep individuals from processing new information about each unique 
individual because some group-based generalizations are already present. From an 
information-processing perspective, stereotypes can thus offer efficient shortcuts (see 
Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Given the fact that the mass media is everywhere in our world, 
it comes as no surprise that we receive many such simplified pictures from mass-
mediated portrayals (e.g., Dixon, 2006).
Once formed, stereotypic memory traces can be re-activated (i.e., primed) by addi-
tional media exposure. This can influence subsequent perceptions of social stimuli. 
Thus, media-stereotype priming refers to the short-term impact of stereotypic news on 
subsequent perceptions, judgments, and behaviors (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-
Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2009). Media priming has a reliable effect according to one 
meta-analysis (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007).
It is important to refer to a distinction drawn by current stereotype theory, which 
separates stereotyping into two stages: automatic activation of concepts held in the 
memory and their (more or less) controlled application. Stereotypical associations that 
are held in the memory can become activated, irrespective of whether a person consid-
ers these associations as accurate or not (Greenwald et al., 2002). However, stereotype 
application refers to the use of stereotypical associations in making judgments about a 
social stimulus. Thus, even if stereotypes were automatically activated, individuals 
could reject these cognitions and decide not to use them for an overtly expressed judg-
ment (Devine, 1989). Nevertheless, individuals must have the motivation and the abil-
ity (e.g., time, cognitive resources) to do so (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Olson 
& Fazio, 2009).
Building on previous research, I expected that each exposure to a dark-skinned as 
opposed to a light-skinned criminal should strengthen the cognitive association 
between “dark skin” and “crime” in the memory via the simultaneous activation of 
both concepts (Dixon & Azocar, 2007). Most importantly, the assumption here is that 
the strength of the automatic association can be understood as the potential for one 
concept (e.g., dark skin) to activate another (e.g., criminal; see Greenwald et al., 2002). 
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Hence, when an environmental input stimulus such as the face of an unknown stranger 
is encountered in a situation following exposure to news stereotypes, cues that activate 
dark skin in the memory will also activate criminal or associatively related concepts 
(e.g., aggressive, rude, dangerous, angry) with an increased likelihood. Indeed, 
research has shown that even brief exposure to news stereotypes can have an effect on 
the strength of automatic associations in the memory (e.g., Arendt, 2012; Park, Felix, 
& Lee, 2007).
There is vast empirical evidence showing that exposure to stereotypic news cover-
age can have detrimental priming effects on societally important outcome factors. For 
example, Oliver (1999) found that individuals tend to misidentify a White offender 
depicted in the news as Black. Participants identified photographs immediately after 
exposure and again three months later. Over time, participants exposed to the stereo-
typic media content showed an increase in misidentification. Individuals were increas-
ingly likely to misidentify Blacks, despite having been exposed to a White offender. 
There are many studies showing similar, important consequences of media-stereotype 
exposure (e.g., Dixon, 2007, 2009; Mastro, Behm-Morawitz, & Kopacz, 2008; Oliver 
& Fonash, 2002). Prior research has also identified important moderators of such 
effects. At a most basic level, news stereotype-priming effects fade with time (Arendt, 
2013b) and are dependent on the frequency of activation (Arendt, 2013c). This is con-
sistent with priming research outside the news stereotype context (Grant & Logan, 
1993; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; McNamara, 2005; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 
2007; Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009; Srull & Wyer, 1979). Furthermore, individuals 
already holding stereotypic thoughts and feelings before exposure tend to show even 
stronger exposure effects (Dixon, 2006), and members of the stereotyped social cate-
gory are less likely to show news effects; rather, under some circumstances, they show 
effects even in the opposite direction (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000). In addition, there is 
evidence that prior news consumption (i.e., long-term exposure to news stereotypes) 
moderates subsequent exposure effects (Dixon, 2006): Those with high levels of prior 
exposure show stronger effects.
The Face in Media-Priming Research
Media research already exists on the manipulation of facial features. Dixon and 
Maddox (2005) examined the memorability of a perpetrator of a crime story. Data 
analysis indicated that individuals found the perpetrator more memorable when he was 
Black rather than White. This investigation focused on how different facial attributes 
(i.e., a White, a light-skinned Black, a medium-skinned Black, and a dark-skinned 
Black perpetrator) influence memorability. In a similar vein, the results of an experi-
ment conducted by Oliver, Jackson, Moses, and Dangerfield (2004) showed that read-
ers’ memories of Afrocentric features were significantly more pronounced when the 
news story contained crime, particularly violent crime. Although these studies made 
important contributions to the media-priming literature, they did not investigate the 
research problem that is central to the present study: news stereotype effects on impul-
sive facial-threat perceptions.
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Media Effects on Impulsive Facial-Threat Perceptions
Now, I try to connect news stereotype-priming research and facial-perception research 
(see also Arendt, Steindl, & Vitouch, 2014). As already mentioned, individuals evalu-
ate faces in a few hundred milliseconds (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Such a fast, impul-
sive face evaluation is beneficial in social interactions because emotional expressions 
often signal the behavioral intentions of the individual displaying the emotion (Marsh 
et al., 2005). An accurate and quick assessment of a potential threat was beneficial in 
our hunter-gatherer ancestors and continues to be so even in today’s world (Oosterhof 
& Todorov, 2008).
A study conducted by Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) can be viewed as the 
necessary link between news stereotype research and research on the perception of 
facial threat. The authors hypothesized that stereotypes influence the decoding of 
facial displays. The authors used short movies in which the computer-generated facial 
expressions morphed from neutral to threatening expressions. The clips featured dark-
skinned and light-skinned faces. Participants responded by pressing a button when 
they thought they saw a new (i.e., hostile) expression unambiguously displayed by the 
target. Evidence from their experiment confirmed the hypothesis. Individuals with a 
strong automatic association between the group concept (i.e., dark skin) and negative 
attributes saw hostility appearing more quickly on dark-skinned faces compared to 
light-skinned faces.
Combining the findings from previous research reviewed above whereby even brief 
exposure to media stereotypes can influence automatic stereotype activation, and 
whereby automatically activated evaluations increase perceived facial threat, I deduced 
the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Exposure to crime news about crimes committed by dark-
skinned criminals increases impulsive facial-threat perceptions of meeting dark-
skinned strangers in a subsequent situation.
Given the fact that the human face is central to social interactions and therefore of 
primary importance in social perception, such media effects have serious implications 
for everyday life. Although news stereotype research has already documented the 
effects on automatically activated stereotypes or attitudes (e.g., Park et al., 2007), as 
being dependent on facial features (e.g., Oliver et al., 2004), and has revealed other 
important consequences as reported above (e.g., Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000), research 
has yet to prove the link between exposure to news stereotypes and the impulsive per-
ception of facial threat. Thus, the repeated mass-mediated pairing of a social category 
(e.g., based on skin color) with attributes such as “criminal” may not only prime (or 
form) stereotypes or attitudes in the recipient’s mind (i.e., relevance on the cognitive 
and affective level) but also color face processing during actual social interaction in 
ways that can increase the likelihood that essentially any dark-skinned person is per-
ceived as potentially threatening (i.e., relevance on the behavioral level). Therefore, 
the present research did not focus on the consequences of media-stereotype exposure 
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on the “pictures in our heads” (Lippman, 1922). Instead, the present research investi-
gates whether media stereotypes might influence actual social behavior by influencing 
the perception of facial displays.
Ambiguity as a Boundary Condition
Roskos-Ewoldsen and colleagues (2009) stated that “research exploring the boundar-
ies of media priming effects is important” (p. 88). I have already referred to previous 
research revealing the moderators of news stereotype-priming effects (temporal delay, 
frequency of activation, prior stereotypes, group membership, prior news exposure). 
Ambiguity is a further factor that is theoretically assumed to act as a moderator. Media-
priming researchers argue—at least on an implicit level—that primed memory traces 
should influence the interpretation of a social-target stimulus under the condition of 
ambiguity. For example, Roskos-Ewoldsen and colleagues (2007) noted that a “typical 
newscast covers a wide variety of topics, which may result in the priming of a corre-
spondingly wide variety of concepts, which increases the likelihood that one of the 
primed items will influence how we interpret later ambiguous information” (p. 54, 
italics added). This notion has enormous face validity. Consider an example (see 
Hansen & Hansen, 1988): Suppose sex role stereotypes had been primed by watching 
sex role stereotypes (e.g., sexualized depictions in commercials). In a subsequent situ-
ation, the viewer observes a real man and woman interacting socially. The media-
priming hypothesis states that due to the fact that sex role stereotypes have just recently 
been activated, the perceiver is likely to evaluate the social interaction more in terms 
of the primed stereotype. However, if the woman and man romantically kiss each other 
while holding each other arm-in-arm, the situation is unambiguous. In this situation, 
media priming may not exhibit any effect at all. Nevertheless, when both are standing 
and engaged in a conversation laughing with each other, the situation can be perceived 
as more ambiguous: Are they flirting or just joking? According to the media-priming 
hypothesis, the perceiver is more likely to interpret this social interaction in terms of 
flirting instead of joking.
Ambiguity refers to situations in which (social) information does not have an obvi-
ous, unanimously agreeable interpretation. For example, Frisch and Baron (1988) 
defined ambiguity “as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a 
prediction” (p. 152; italics added). In contrast, unambiguous situations “provide clear 
outcomes that would be obvious to others” (Mastro et al., 2008, p. 9). When interpret-
ing ambiguous social information, judgments must be made under uncertainty. In the 
example made above, a woman and a man romantically kissing each other will likely 
elicit an obvious, unanimously agreeable interpretation. In contrast, when both are 
standing and are engaged in a conversation, the flirting, as well as the joking interpre-
tation is possible.
There is a line of research testing the ambiguity hypothesis using the so-called 
mismemory-effect approach (Dixon, 2007, 2009; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Oliver, 
1999; Oliver & Fonash, 2002). This mismemory effect describes a phenomenon where 
an “incomplete” crime script generates strong expectations for “missing” details. This 
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leads recipients to “fill in” the gaps in the story. These filled-in story details are then 
memorized in addition to the “real” story details.
I have already discussed Gilliam and Iyengar’s (2000) perspective on crime scripts. 
In the context of the present research, the mismemory effect describes the phenome-
non whereby individuals who read a crime story with no reference to the perpetrator’s 
skin color do indeed tend falsely to recall having seen a dark-skinned perpetrator con-
sistent with the pervasive cultural stereotype of “dark-skinned criminals.” For exam-
ple, Dixon (2009) found that when exposed to unidentified suspects, participants were 
more likely to guess that the suspects were Black rather than White. This is consistent 
with a vast number of studies in social cognition showing that individuals routinely 
engage in top-down processing in which expectations concerning social groups and 
their attributes guide the encoding and memory of social information (Fiske & Taylor, 
2013). As Dixon (2009) noted, this effect “results from ‘ambiguous’ targets being pro-
cessed” (p. 26). As the recipients lack concrete evidence about the offender, they infer 
what “must” be the case (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000, p. 564).
Along similar lines, other studies using the ambiguity concept found supporting 
empirical evidence as well (Chang, 2014; Mastro et al., 2008). Based on this literature, 
ambiguity of facial expressions is expected to represent a boundary condition for the 
news stereotype-priming effect: If the facial expression is unambiguously angry or 
neutral, individuals may not have any difficulties decoding the meaning. However, 
when the facial expression is ambiguous (i.e., somewhere in between neutral and 
angry), individuals may have much more difficulty in decoding the meaning and/or the 
behavioral intentions of the individual displaying the emotion. In this situation, the 
perceiver may rely on the use of stereotypes to fill in missing stereotype-consistent 
information. Other facial attributes such as skin color may be used as a heuristic to 
gather more evidence for the decision. As news stereotype exposure can prime stereo-
typic memory traces, those exposed to stereotypic news may rely more on their stereo-
types. As already noted, this may increase the likelihood that essentially any 
dark-skinned stranger encountered in a subsequent situation is perceived as a potential 
threat.
The first hypothesis assumes that exposure to news stereotypes influences impul-
sive facial-threat perceptions. However, I expected media-priming effects to occur 
only if the facial expression was ambiguous. The ambiguity hypothesis, therefore, 
constrains the scope of the first hypothesis1:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Exposure to stereotypic crime news has an effect on impulsive 
facial-threat perception but only when the facial displays are ambiguous.
As the review of the previous literature suggests, a substantial amount of research 
has addressed the ambiguity hypothesis. Although previous research has accumulated 
a considerable body of data, the present research, however, can add supplementary 
empirical evidence to this literature. First, some studies used the “mismemory-effect” 
approach (e.g., Oliver & Fonash, 2002) and, thus, investigated a rather cognitive bias. 
The present research tries to reveal a bias in the impulsive perception of affective 
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social information (i.e., emotional expressions). Second, previous research studied 
ambiguity rather as an attribute of the media content such as unidentified suspects (i.e., 
Dixon, 2009) or as a recipient-related factor such as attitudinal ambivalence (Chang, 
2014). However, theory actually predicts that priming should be most effective when 
the target in a subsequent situation following news exposure is ambiguous. The pres-
ent research thus uses facial expressions of target persons. Third, in contrast to previ-
ous research using ambiguity as a nominal variable (e.g., identified or unidentified 
subjects), the present research tests the ambiguity hypothesis using an experimentally 
manipulated factor with varying levels of ambiguity. The manipulation of facial 
expressions using three-dimensional face-modeling software allows for the creation of 
facial expressions on a continuum ranging from unambiguously “neutral” to unam-
biguously “angry,” with ambiguous expressions falling on a metric continuum in 
between (see Arendt, 2013c).
Unambiguously emotional faces are rarely observable in everyday interaction. In 
contrast, individuals typically have to decode somewhat ambiguous facial displays. 
This requires “at least a modicum of interpretation” (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
2003, p. 640). Although the study of the ambiguity hypothesis within the facial-per-
ception context is an important contribution to theory, it is important from a practical 
point of view as well: “Disambiguating an ambiguous facial display is not only a com-
mon occurrence” (p. 640) but also one in which media-stereotype exposure may have 
a potent influence.
Additional Theorizing
The activation of associatively related concepts when encountering a social stimulus 
such as facial displays operates rather automatically (see Bargh, 1994). Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that individuals do not have the power to resist their automatically 
evoked thoughts about a stranger. Even if negative thoughts were automatically acti-
vated when encountering an unknown, dark-skinned stranger, individuals can reject 
these cognitions and decide never to use them for an overtly expressed judgment 
(Devine, 1989). However, such a correction requires a certain amount of processing 
time, intention, and cognitive capacity. Thus, only if the individual is motivated to 
arrive at an unbiased judgment and has enough time to reflect is a correction process 
possible. For example, the flexible correction model (Wegener & Petty, 1997) suggests 
that people can adjust their judgment if they are aware of a contextual effect. This can 
be stereotypic media content that is perceived as noncredible. Specifically, this theory 
assumes that if individuals perceive themselves to be influenced, they will attempt to 
correct these influences by shifting their judgment in the opposite direction of the 
perceived bias. For example, Arendt (2012) showed that attributed text-credibility 
moderated the effects of media-stereotype exposure on explicit stereotypes (i.e., 
overtly expressed stereotypic judgments) but not the effects on implicit stereotypes 
(i.e., automatically activated stereotypic concepts). The fact that perceived credibility 
moderated the effect with regard to the overtly expressed stereotypic judgment, but not 
regarding implicit stereotypes, leads to the conclusion that media stereotype’s impact 
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on automatically evoked responses is relatively independent from correction 
processes.
As already mentioned, first impulsive impressions from faces are made within a 
split second (Willis & Todorov, 2006): Faces can be judged even after a 100-millisec-
ond exposure. During this brief exposure time, controlled thinking is not possible. 
Thus, the assumption is that only the automatic activation stage of stereotyping is 
likely to be involved at this stage of impression formation. A correction process should 
not occur. Even if the media content is perceived as noncredible, individuals do not 
have the time to correct for a presumed contextual effect when forming a fast, impul-
sive impression of a person. Therefore, a third hypothesis could be postulated:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The media-priming effect on impulsive facial-threat percep-
tions is independent of the perceived credibility of the stereotypic media content.
Method
An experiment was undertaken to test whether reading stereotypic crime news influ-
ences the impulsive perception of facial threat. The study builds on previous content 
research that showed that crime news tends to associate specific social (minority) 
groups with negative behavior (Dixon, 2009). In Austria, where the experiment was 
conducted, it has been documented that the category of “foreigners” is overrepresented 
as criminals in the leading tabloid-style daily newspaper (Arendt, 2010). In addition, 
(dark) skin color is repeatedly paired with crime in specific Austrian news media, 
which may contribute to the reinforcement of the “dark-skinned criminal” stereotype 
(Horvath, 2006). As already noted, similar news stereotypes have been revealed in 
other countries such as Germany (Ruhrmann & Songül, 2000), the United States 
(Dixon & Linz, 2000), and the Netherlands (Vergeer et al., 2000) as well.2
An experimental design with two groups was used. Participants read eight crime 
articles merged with four unrelated, bogus texts. The crime articles were manipulated: 
For the treatment group (n = 53), “dark-skinned criminals” were mentioned as the 
offenders. In contrast, for the control group (n = 52), skin color was not mentioned at 
all. After reading the crime texts, participants completed the impulsive facial-threat 
perception task.
Participants
One hundred five students enrolled in a lecture on communication research partici-
pated in the study. Of these students, 74.3% were female. The participants ranged in 
age from 19 to 37 (M = 21.91, SD = 2.69).3
Experimental Manipulation
Crime articles were constructed from original texts published by a highly circulated, 
daily tabloid newspaper. It is fairly uncommon that dark skin is overtly referred to in 
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crime texts (Arendt, 2010) but is presented in a more subtle way through visuals 
(Messaris & Abraham, 2001) or language (Wodak & Reisigl, 1999). Thus, specific 
foreign nationalities targeted at countries (stereotypically) associated with dark-
skinned inhabitants were used to prime the “dark-skinned criminal” stereotype. I 
used specific nations based on a pretest (Arendt et al., 2014). This pretest ensured 
that the reading of these specific nations (e.g., Nigeria, India, Turkey) activated the 
“dark-skinned” concept in the participants’ memory. The eight crime texts for the 
control condition and the treatment condition were identical with only one excep-
tion: Nation concepts served as cues to activate the “dark-skinned” concept in the 
treatment texts, once in the headline, and once more in the body of each text. In 
contrast, for the control group, cues indicating skin color were not mentioned at all. 
All the texts were similar to each other: There was only one male offender per text, 
all crimes took place in the same European city (but in different districts), and all 
had a similar (short) text length.
Measures
Impulsive facial-threat perceptions. We measured impulsive facial-threat perceptions 
after reading in an ostensibly unrelated part of the experiment. Computer-generated 
faces from six unknown people were presented on a computer screen. Of these per-
sons, three were dark-skinned and three were light-skinned. Eleven computer-gener-
ated faces were used for each person. This resulted in 66 face pictures (=11 facial-threat 
levels × 6 persons). These faces were created using three-dimensional face-modeling 
software that generates highly realistic facial structures. The faces were taken from 
previous facial-perception research and, thus, are pretested and validated (Corneille, 
Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007). These 11 faces ranged from “0% angry” to “100% angry” 
in increments of 10%. I expected a sigmoid functional relationship between the facial-
threat level and “angry” ratings based on previous research (Corneille et al., 2007, 
Figure 4). Of interest, what constitutes an ambiguous threat level can be deduced 
empirically when looking at participants’ threat ratings. I defined ambiguous-threat 
levels as the range between unambiguous neutral and unambiguous angry facial 
expressions (i.e., between the bottom and the top of the s-curve). Thus, it is defined as 
the range of facial-threat levels where there is a substantial increase in threat percep-
tions (i.e., a strong increase in the slope of the s-curve). One visual example is given 
in the “Results” section.
The ostensible goal of the task was in the investigation of “how judgments are 
made under time pressure.” Faces were presented for 300 milliseconds (i.e., short 
flashes) and then were overlapped with a mask (a black rectangle with white noise). 
Participants had to press the left button if they thought the facial expression was “neu-
tral” (German: neutral). If they thought the facial expression was “angry” (zornig), 
they had to press the right button. Most importantly, the decision had to be made after 
the face was seen only for a very short time. Thus, the decision is assumed to be impul-
sive, driven only by the mere first impression of the face. Although participants had as 
much time as they wanted after the face was masked, the procedure provoked fast, 
split-second responses (see the “Results” section).4
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After a practice block, the test block was administered and consisted of 66 indi-
vidual trials presented in random order: 6 computer-generated persons (3 dark-skinned 
+ 3 light-skinned) × 11 (different threat levels). The software recorded the judgments 
(neutral or angry) for each face and the latencies of these judgments (i.e., time elapsed 
between the onset of the face and participant’s judgment) in milliseconds. The forced-
choice decisions (coded as 0/1) and the latency scores were averaged for each threat 
level across all dark-skinned persons.5
Attributed text-credibility. To measure the perceived credibility of the crime articles, I 
used a scale from previous research (Arendt, 2012). Participants were asked on a 
7-point scale ranging from I totally disagree (1) to I totally agree (7) about their agree-
ment with four statements (“The texts were credible,” “The texts inspired confidence,” 
“The texts were well-researched,” “The texts were well-balanced and fair”; M = 2.42, 
SD = 1.08, Cronbach’s α = .79).
Procedure
Small groups of participants were welcomed in a waiting room. The experimenter went 
with them to another room. Each participant sat down in front of a computer in individ-
ual research cubicles. First, they read the tabloid articles. Second, they took the impul-
sive facial-threat perception task. Finally, they filled out a computer-administered survey. 
After finishing the data collection, the participants were debriefed and dismissed.
Results
The assumption was that reading about “dark-skinned criminals” in stereotypic crime 
news influences impulsive facial-threat perceptions of unknown, dark-skinned strangers 
encountered in a subsequent situation (H1), but only when the facial expression is ambigu-
ous (H2). To test these predictions, a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was conducted to assess whether there were treatment con-
dition (between-subjects) and facial-threat-level (within-subjects) differences in the per-
ceived facial threat from dark-skinned strangers. Results indicated a significant main effect 
of facial-threat level, F(6.02, 619.77) = 404.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .80, but not of the 
treatment condition, F(1, 103) = 1.25, p = .27, partial η2 = .01. More importantly, there was 
an interaction between the experimental condition and facial-threat level, F(6.02, 619.77) 
= 2.22, p = .04, partial η2 = .02. This indicates that even though individuals in the treatment 
condition did not generally rate the dark-skinned faces as any more or less threatening than 
individuals in the control condition, individuals in the treatment condition did rate faces 
with a particular facial-threat level differently than individuals did in the control condition. 
At a most basic level, this supports H1.
H2 predicted that stereotypic media content produces priming effects when facial 
expressions are ambiguous. Thus, I did not expect substantial differences at very low or 
very high facial-threat levels, but at an intermediate level. Due to the fact that the faces 
are validated, the assumption was that very low and very high levels would produce 
clear judgments (0, 1) on the “neutral or angry” forced-choice measure. As already 
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noted, I expected a sigmoid functional relationship between facial-threat level and per-
ceived-threat ratings (Corneille et al., 2007). The strongest effects of news stereotype 
exposure were expected in the area around the inflection point of the s-curve.
To gain a thorough understanding of the media effect, nonlinear regression analysis 
was used to fit two sigmoid functions (a four-parameter model with variable slope) to 
the data: one for each experimental condition. I used the means and the corresponding 
standard deviations from the mixed ANOVA as input values for nonlinear regression 
(equations are not reported). It points to an increase in the impulsive perception of 
facial threat in the treatment condition compared to the control condition. This is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
To test H2 formally, I calculated the mean threat ratings across the ambiguous and 
unambiguous facial-threat levels. What constitutes an ambiguous threat level was 
defined with the help of the sigmoid functions. Both s-curves have a very similar 
appearance, as found in previous research (Corneille et al., 2007). Both sigmoid func-
tions allow for the definition of the range of the facial-threat levels where there is a 
substantial increase in effect size (i.e., a strong increase in the s-curve’s slope). This 
increase starts at the threshold (i.e., where the threat ratings leave the bottom) and 
continues until the effect size reaches toward the top, which is an asymptote. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, facial-threat levels of 50%, 60%, 70%, and 80% are clearly within the 
range of the slope’s increase. Therefore, I calculated the means of threat perceptions 
for dark-skinned faces over ambiguous and unambiguous threat levels.
Figure 1. Impulsive facial-threat perception of unknown, dark-skinned strangers dependent 
on the experimental conditions for different facial-threat levels.
Note. The error bars have been omitted for a better illustration. The perceived-threat values can be 
interpreted similarly to those of relative frequencies: In unambiguous neutral faces, participants almost 
never pressed the “angry” button (perceived threat ≈ 0). In contrast, in unambiguous angry faces, 
participants pressed the “angry” button nearly every time (perceived threat ≈ 1). The two s-curves are 
fitted using nonlinear regression analysis (see text).
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Next, I used a mixed ANOVA to assess whether there were treatment condition 
(between-subjects) and ambiguity (ambiguous or unambiguous facial-threat level; 
within-subjects) differences in the perceived threat of dark-skinned strangers. If ambi-
guity moderates the news stereotype-priming effect, a significant interaction effect 
should emerge. This is what I found, F(1, 103) = 6.48, p = .01, partial η2 = .06. As 
expected, the treatment condition (M = 0.61, SD = 0.18) differed substantially from the 
control condition (M = 0.53, SD = 0.19) in the perceived facial threat of ambiguous 
faces, t(103) = 2.09, p = .02. In contrast, when comparing the means of the unambigu-
ous facial-threat levels of 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 90%, and 100%, I found no 
mean difference between the treatment group (M = 0.33, SD = 0.10) and the control 
group (M = 0.32, SD = 0.07), t(103) = 0.48, p = .64. Taken together, the data support 
the assumption that exposure to news stereotypes produces an impulsive facial-threat 
perception bias, but only in ambiguous facial expressions. H2 was supported.6
Until now, I have only used data for dark-skinned faces. Nevertheless, data for 
light-skinned faces were also recorded. It is important to note that the theory assumes 
an effect when the skin color of the faces encountered in a subsequent situation cor-
responds to the skin color of the (dark-skinned) mediated criminals. In this case, the 
news stereotype was assumed applicable for the interpretation of new social informa-
tion. I did not hypothesize the same effect for light-skinned faces. As a first step, I ran 
the same mixed ANOVA for light-skinned faces as reported in the last paragraph. 
Although the interaction (Treatment × Ambiguity) achieved significance for dark-
skinned faces, there should be no interaction for light-skinned faces. In fact, the inter-
action effect did not achieve significance, F(1, 103) = 0.27, p = .60, partial η2 = .003. 
This points to the fact that there was no news stereotype-priming effect for light-
skinned faces.
To formally test if the skin color of the target (dark-skinned or light-skinned) mod-
erates the treatment effect, a further mixed ANOVA was conducted. I assessed whether 
the two-way interaction (Treatment × Ambiguity) reported above was significantly 
dependent on the target’s skin color. I expected the news stereotype-priming effect 
(i.e., the exposure effect on perceived threat, but only for ambiguous faces) only for 
dark-skinned faces rather than for light-skinned faces. This would be indicated by a 
significant, three-way interaction. This is supported by the data, F(1, 103) = 6.70, p = 
.01, partial η2 = .06. Taken together, this indicates that reading about “dark-skinned 
criminals” influenced the perceived facial threat of dark-skinned faces but did not 
influence the impulsive threat perceptions of light-skinned faces.
H3 assumed that the media-priming effect on the impulsive perception of facial 
threat is independent of the perceived credibility of the stereotypic media content. To 
test this hypothesis, the mean of all ambiguous facial-threat levels (50%, 60%, 70%, 
80%) was predicted by experimental condition, attributed text-credibility, and their 
interaction term. A moderation effect would be indicated by a significant interaction 
term. As predicted, the unstandardized interaction term did not achieve significance, 
Coeff. = −0.01, SE = 0.03, p = .89. Thus, the media effect on the perception of impul-
sive facial threat was largely independent of the perceived credibility of the crime 
news articles. This supports H3.
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Additional Analyses
Due to the fact that ambiguous facial expressions are more difficult to decode, it seems 
reasonable to assume that individuals have to consider more additional information to 
“fill in” the “missing” information (see Notes 4 and 5). Thus, I additionally tested if 
the participants needed longer to reach a conclusion for ambiguous faces rather than 
for unambiguous faces. The lab software recorded the latencies in milliseconds for 
each facial-threat response. I ran a similar analysis as reported for H1, except that the 
latencies were used as the dependent variable. Due to the fact that the latency data 
were skewed, a nonparametric test was chosen. In fact, a Friedman test showed that 
there were differences among the mean ranks of facial-threat ratings of dark-skinned 
faces, χ2(10, N = 105) = 128.53, p < .001. This effect was largely driven by ambiguous 
facial-threat levels (see Figure 2). Participants needed longer to build a judgment for 
ambiguous faces rather than for unambiguous faces.7
Discussion
Facial expressions play an important role in the display and perception of emotional 
states and thus are very important in everyday life. Data from the present experiment 
showed that exposure to news stereotypes can influence the perception of a facial 
threat from unknown strangers: Reading news about crimes committed by dark-
skinned criminals increased the perceived facial threat of meeting dark-skinned strang-
ers in a subsequent situation, but only when the facial display was ambiguous. This 
finding is especially remarkable when one considers the fact that the stereotypic crime 
Figure 2. Latencies (Mdn) of the “neutral or angry” forced-choice decision for dark-skinned 
faces dependent on the facial-threat level.
Note. The latencies describe the time elapsed between the onset of the face and the participant’s 
judgment. Error bars represent the confidence interval (95%, bootstrapping, 1,000 samples, percentile 
method). Points are connected with lines for a better illustration.
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texts neither mentioned skin color directly, nor did they contain any pictures of dark-
skinned criminals. Thus, the effect is due only to the mentions of foreign nationalities 
that are associated with dark skin (stereotype). This finding advances news stereotype-
priming research by showing an effect on a highly relevant social factor (i.e., impul-
sive facial-threat perceptions), which has not been investigated prior to the present 
experiment. Although previous research revealed that media-stereotype exposure has 
consequences on stereotypes and attitudes, the present study indicates that media ste-
reotypes might influence actual social behavior by influencing the impulsive percep-
tion of facial displays of stereotyped targets (see Arendt et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the experiment adds supportive empirical evidence to the inherent 
assumption of media-priming effects under conditions of ambiguity rather than unam-
biguity. Thus, this study investigated the conditions under which media-priming 
effects occur and—equally importantly—the conditions under which they do not. The 
present research, thus, is consistent with previous research testing the ambiguity 
hypothesis using the mismemory approach (Dixon, 2009; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; 
Oliver, 1999; Oliver & Fonash, 2002). In addition, the effect of media-stereotype 
exposure appeared to be largely independent of the perceived credibility of the media 
content.
The most apparent and socially relevant consequence is that exposure to such ste-
reotypic crime news can have detrimental consequences on the impulsive perception 
of facial threat. Note that this is not a general effect, but it seems to be limited to mem-
bers of a social category who have a direct correspondence within the media content: 
Reading about dark-skinned criminals influenced the perception of the facial threat 
from dark-skinned strangers encountered in a subsequent situation. Reading these 
texts did not have a general effect on the interpretation of facial threat for all humans: 
The perception of light-skinned individuals’ facial threat was not influenced by 
exposure.
Imagine that reading about dark-skinned criminals influences the threat perception 
of dark-skinned politicians. Considering the pervasiveness of the “dark-skinned crimi-
nal” stereotype (Dixon & Azocar, 2007; Horvath, 2006), it comes as no surprise that 
U.S. campaigners might (at least implicitly) have had a similar idea in mind when 
trying to lighten Barack Obama’s face during his election campaign. In contrast, oppo-
nents may try to darken skin color to exploit negative associations that voters might 
have with darker skin. Similar strategies may be used in advertising as well (see 
Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009).
Are We Somewhat Defenseless?
It is important to note that individuals are not defenseless against news stereotype-
priming effects on impression formation. Please remember the distinction drawn by 
current stereotyping theory between the automatic activation of stereotypic associa-
tions held in the memory and the (more or less) controlled decision to use them 
(Devine, 1989). At the automatic activation stage of the stereotyping process, indi-
viduals can be seen as somewhat defenseless: First, exposure to media stereotypes 
heightens the strength of the automatic association between a social-group concept 
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and attributes. Second, when encountering a social stimulus activating the social-
group concept in a subsequent situation, the previously-linked attribute becomes auto-
matically activated with an increased likelihood. Based on the current experiment, this 
has detrimental consequences on impulsive facial-threat perceptions. However, it is 
important to note that people can correct their first impressions (during the second 
stage of the stereotyping process) for a more controlled response: Even if the first 
impression automatically evoked when encountering a face is negative, individuals 
can decide not to use these first impressions for an overall judgment of this person.
It is the task of mass communication research to reveal mediated stereotypes and 
their effects. Only by knowing that our impulsive perceptions based on our “gut feel-
ings” may be systematically biased can we correct such automatically evoked reac-
tions when we are interacting with stereotypically depicted category members. Of 
interest, there is evidence that we can resist our automatically evoked reactions by 
using reflexive thinking (Arendt, 2013a). If we spend some time and cognitive effort 
in rumination, we can decide not to use our automatically evoked impulsive responses 
(Devine, 1989). Thus, a good first strategy to overcome possible detrimental news 
effects is to take the time to think. A second strategy, as Dixon (2009) noted, is that we 
should actually be very careful of what we are reading: “You should definitely expose 
yourself to the news, but you should consider what kind of news you consume. Be 
very careful of crime news, and approach it with a critical eye” (p. 29). These recipi-
ent-based strategies (taking the time to think, selective exposure) can be seen as a 
heuristic to overcome possible negative-news stereotype effects.
Implications for Journalists
What should be clear at this point is that negative depictions of social (minority) 
groups in the media can have detrimental consequences. Therefore, what journalists 
report on is not without consequences. I already pointed to recipient-based strategies 
(taking the time to think, selective exposure) that can be used to overcome possible 
negative effects. Nevertheless, a media-based strategy is also worth noting. Journalists 
should question if reporting some group-related characteristics such as nationality or 
skin color is relevant to the story (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000). There seem to be two 
conflicting interests at play: On the one hand, some journalists may argue that it is the 
duty of professional journalism to report every detail of the story, including group-
related characteristics. It would be a form of self-censorship, which goes hand-in-hand 
with an inherent negative connotation. In addition, the detailed coverage of social-
category cues may raise community awareness and identify criminal suspects. On the 
other hand, media-stereotyping research has revealed that exposure to stereotypic 
content can have negative consequences such as biased, impulsive facial-threat per-
ceptions. Assuming that most journalists do not want to be prejudiced, there should, 
whenever possible, be widespread agreement to omit some group-related characteris-
tics pertaining to historically marginalized social categories. Thus, the most important 
question in this context of two conflictive interests is if it really is necessary to report 
social-category cues that refer to historically marginalized minority groups.
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Clearly, it is not the intention and is not within the scope of this research to give a 
definitive answer. In contrast, I argue that journalists should ask the “really necessary” 
question each time before including group-related information into their news cover-
age. Of course, in some situations it may be seen as necessary (e.g., crime alerts) and 
in other situations there is simply no possibility of omitting category-related character-
istics (e.g., a well-known politician accused of corruption). That is a matter of public 
concern. Even in such cases, the question remains if group-related information must 
be covered saliently (e.g., in headlines, leads, or visuals; see Arendt, 2012, for an 
investigation of effect thresholds on automatic stereotype activation). Taken together, 
the cautious request from a realist viewpoint is that group-related characteristics per-
taining to historically marginalized groups should be omitted wherever possible.
For media organizations, it might be a valuable goal to facilitate hiring journalists 
with sufficient (social scientific) knowledge of society, culture, and its (historically 
marginalized) groups and media stereotypes. It should be an important part of educa-
tion, included in the curricula of communication departments, to disseminate the avail-
able knowledge from media-stereotyping research to future media practitioners. 
Furthermore, increasing the diversity in newsrooms can also help in achieving this 
goal (see Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000, for a similar argument).
Limitations
Like every study, this one has its limitations. First, the “angry” concept was used as the 
target concept in the impulsive facial-threat perception task. This was done based on 
previous research, where the angry concept was also used (Corneille et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the angry concept only deals with a presumed emotional expression of 
another person. In contrast, perceived facial threat requires an additional step: Even 
if we recognize anger in someone’s facial display, we have to make additional infer-
ences based on the social situation to infer the level of threat for us. However, I 
introduced the perception task with the sentence that researchers “are interested if 
the facial expression appears neutral or angry for you.” The phrase “for you” was 
mentioned three times in the task introduction to make this salient to the partici-
pants. Furthermore, angry faces potentiate avoidance and defensive responses 
(Marsh et al., 2005). Thus, the angry concept seemed to be a good starting point for 
an impulsive facial-threat perception task. Nevertheless, future research can use dif-
ferent concepts such as “proximate” ones that deal directly with threat (e.g., threat-
ening) as well as more “distant” ones (e.g., competence). The selection of distant 
concepts depends on the broadness of the culturally held stereotype under study (see 
Devine, 1989). However, such spreading activation effects are possible and certainly 
worth testing.
Second, it should be noted that this research only investigated the main effect of 
exposure to news stereotypes on the impulsive perception of facial threat. This study 
did not investigate the processes underlying this effect. However, I argue that a causal 
relationship between news stereotype exposure and impulsive facial-threat percep-
tions should be examined first. This is done in the current experiment. Then, the 
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conditions under which this effect is more or less pronounced or even eliminated 
(moderators), as well as the mechanisms underlying this effect (mediators) can be 
investigated. One important question with regard to mediation is which specific con-
cept associations mediate the media effect on impulsive facial-threat perceptions. 
From theory’s perspective, one would assume that the associative link between the 
group concept (e.g., skin color) and relevant attributes (e.g., criminal, dangerous, 
angry) should mediate the treatment effect. With regard to moderation, the face expo-
sure time could be a relevant moderator variable. If the time is varied, this may have 
serious implications for the resulting media-priming effect on the perception of facial 
threat. Please note that I investigated news effects on impulsive facial-threat percep-
tions based on short flashes of the faces (i.e., 300 milliseconds). If the participants had 
a longer time to look at each of the faces (e.g., 10 seconds), this would make a correc-
tion process possible and thus more likely (see the “taking the time to think” reduction 
strategy described above). It seems likely that individuals, when having enough time 
to reach a decision, and who are highly motivated to act in an unprejudiced manner, 
correct for possible, presumed negative media influences. The study of potential mod-
erators (e.g., exposure time) and mediators (e.g., automatically activated associations) 
would be a good starting point for future research.
Third, the study attempted to measure impulsive facial-threat perception. However, 
insofar as all faces have to go through some kind of conscious attentional filter—the 
faces were not presented subliminally—there may be a reflective aspect to the pro-
cessing that occurs (see Uhlmann et al., 2012; for a discussion of impulsive and reflec-
tive processes, see Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, individuals could have 
attempted to override their automatically evoked responses. Although participants had 
as much time as they wanted after each face was masked, the procedure provoked fast, 
split-second responses. Taken together, the measurement technique used captures a far 
greater proportion of impulsive processing compared to reflective processing. The 
absence of a moderation effect of attributed text-credibility additionally supports this 
interpretation.
Fourth, a student sample was used to test the hypotheses. This was mainly due to 
economic reasons. Although student samples have well-known shortcomings (e.g., 
Meltzer, Naab, & Daschmann, 2012), I think that the specific context of the study may 
increase the appropriateness of such samples. I studied news stereotype effects on 
impulsive facial-threat perceptions, which are assumed to operate on a rather auto-
matic level of information processing. Although students may differ from the general 
population on important factors such as political ideology or education—which may 
affect deliberate judgments—such factors operate in a rather controlled stage of infor-
mation processing. Therefore, these factors may play a smaller role in impulsive 
responses (done in a split second) based on rather automatic processes.
Fifth, the present research used computer-simulated faces of unknown strangers as 
the dependent variable. This implies two potential shortcomings: First, the computer 
simulations may lack external validity. I am aware of this drawback, but computer-
generated faces were used due to their high internal validity. This is consistent 
with previous face-perception research (Corneille et al., 2007). Only the use of a 
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state-of-the-art, three-dimensional, face-modeling software allowed for a reliable 
manipulation of different facial-threat levels. Second, I used the faces of strangers. As 
the faces were unknown to the participants, they had no prior knowledge of the people 
depicted. However, if an individual knows the person expressing the facial display, 
information other than the mere facial expression (or other features such as skin color) 
can be used based on already available, person-related information. For example, if a 
person knows that the individual is choleric, the perceiver may generally perceive a 
higher facial threat. Future research may create face pictures of real and well-known 
individuals (e.g., politicians), for example, from existing audio-visual materials. If 
short movies in which politicians change their facial display from neutral to angry (or 
other emotional states) are available, individual threat pictures can be extracted. Of 
course, the facial-threat continuum cannot be regarded as being as finely graduated as 
with computer simulations. However, this procedure has more external validity and 
thus can be used as a supplement to the method used in the present experiment.
Sixth, a regression-based approach was used to test H3, which assumed that the 
media-priming effect on impulsive facial-threat perceptions is independent of the per-
ceived validity of the stereotypic media content. I used standard nil-null hypothesis 
significance testing to test this hypothesis. Nonsignificant results were interpreted as 
the absence of a moderation effect. It is important to note that this cannot be inter-
preted in terms of statistical equivalence (Weber & Popova, 2012): Equivalence test-
ing would be an alternative method to test this hypothesis. Notwithstanding, those 
tests require the definition of a minimum substantial effect (i.e., lowest effect size that 
researchers identify as consequential). This was not possible in the current research 
project due to the lack of previous knowledge. However, the very high p value of the 
interaction term points (at least) to the absence of a substantial moderation effect of 
credibility.
Conclusion
Despite the limitations, I found that exposure to news stereotypes influences impulsive 
facial-threat perceptions of strangers from negatively depicted social groups. Skin 
color, however, is only one factor in impression formation. Similar media-priming 
effects should be detectable with other person-related features that activate a social 
category (e.g., dialect, clothing). Given the importance of the face and other highly 
salient, person-related features in social interaction, a targeted research effort on news 
stereotypes’ role in this perception process is important.
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Notes
1. One might argue that research in psychology clearly supports the ambiguity hypothesis. 
This may be true for priming effects investigated by psychologists (e.g., repetition or 
semantic priming; see McNamara, 2005). Nevertheless, it is important to note that prim-
ing investigated by (cognitive or social) psychologists and priming effects investigated 
by communication researchers (or media psychologists) might be fundamentally different 
phenomena, and even within the field of communication, there seem to be noteworthy dif-
ferences between media-violence priming, media-stereotype priming, and political priming 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2009). For instance, political-prim-
ing effects typically last longer than priming effects found in psychological experiments 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007). This raises the question if both 
phenomena are really the same: “Simply because both are called ‘priming’ does not mean 
they are then the same phenomenon” (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009, p. 79). Thus, media 
research into the ambiguity hypothesis using externally valid, real-world media primes, 
which appear on a regular basis in media outlets, is necessary to advance news stereotype-
priming literature.
2. Most of the news stereotype research, including the studies using variables such as facial 
expression or skin color, has been conducted in the United States. In this context, the 
dichotomy “Black/White” seems appropriate because prejudice against African Americans 
had been investigated. Nevertheless, this is dependent on the actual context where the 
study is conducted. In Austria, skin color plays a role in the stereotyping process as well. 
However, skin color must be seen more on a continuum between a rather light and a rather 
dark skin. In this country, stereotypic news coverage referring to skin color often goes 
hand-in-hand with concepts such as “immigration,” “foreigners,” and “asylum seeking” 
(Horvath, 2006). Although Blacks also are targets of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimi-
nation, individuals with only slightly darker skin compared to the “average” of the majority 
group (e.g., individuals from Northern Africa, the Middle East, or Southeastern Europe) 
are also targets of prejudice. By using the term dark/light-skinned, a more valid descrip-
tion of the Austrian (or Middle-European) context is made. Therefore, I decided to use this 
term. It must be noted that this study is targeted at the effects of skin color rather than on 
the broader race concept used in the U.S. studies. Nevertheless, skin color is of primary 
salience among the many phenotypic features and thus of primary importance in determin-
ing category membership (see Maddox, 2004).
3. In Austria, the term race (German: Rasse) is a very negatively connoted word due to the 
time under the Nazi regime. This is why using this term in a questionnaire is hard to justify 
and undoubtedly elicits discomfort in the participants (as well as in the researcher). As this 
was an experimental design using a random-allocation procedure, participants were not 
asked for their race and/or skin color. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that 
a predominately “light-skinned” sample was used (based on experimenter observation).
4. Due to the fact that ambiguous facial expressions are more difficult to decode, individu-
als have to consider more additional information. In unambiguous faces, there seems to 
be enough “weight” at one side of the “balance scale” due to the mere recognition of 
the facial expression. The clear-cut inclination of the balance into one of two directions 
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(angry or neutral) is easy to detect. In contrast, in ambiguous facial expressions, social 
information keeps the “beam” more or less balanced. The perceiver has to collect some 
additional weight for one side of the scale. Such additional weight can be collected by 
also considering other facial features. If media exposure has strengthened the cognitive 
link between skin color and detrimental attributes such as dangerous or criminal, then 
skin color could be a sufficient additional weight that tips the beam to the “angry” side of 
the scale. Processing this additional information should need more time than information 
processing in a situation with a clear-cut inclination to one of the directions.
5. It is important to note that the method used does not allow for a comparison between dark-
skinned and light-skinned faces in absolute terms. I used different computer-generated 
persons for dark-skinned and light-skinned targets. Thus, the absolute amount of difference 
can be attributed to other factors (see Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 2007; Schmidt & 
Cohn, 2001). What is most important in this study is the relative difference between the 
experimental conditions: I test the hypotheses for dark-skinned faces by comparing both 
experimental groups. However, data for light-skinned faces were also collected for valid-
ity reasons (see the “Results” section). The Inquisit (Milliseconds Software LLC) script 
containing the used impulsive facial-threat perception task can be obtained upon request.
6. A sigmoidal relationship starts out with a gradual slope, which increases to an inflection 
point, and then levels off as it approaches a maximum value. Although the term ambigu-
ous facial-threat level should be understood in relative terms, I defined facial-threat levels 
as ambiguous when they were located in the threat range with a sharp slope: in the range 
from the point where the curve starts increasing in slope to the point where the maximum 
perceived facial-threat value is almost approached. The facial-threat level of 40% is around 
the threshold-threat level. It depends on whether you look at the curve of the control or 
the treatment group. Thus, I ran the same analysis for ambiguous-threat levels, including 
the 40% threat level. This analysis reaches the same conclusion. There was a difference 
in ambiguous faces (40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%) between the treatment condition (M = 
0.52, SD = 0.17) and the control condition (M = 0.45, SD = 0.17), t(103) = 1.91, p = .03. In 
contrast, when comparing the means of the unambiguous facial-threat levels of 0%, 10%, 
20%, 30%, 90%, and 100%, I found no mean difference between the treatment group (M = 
0.35, SD = 0.06) and the control group (M = 0.36, SD = 0.10), t(103) = 0.76, p = .45.
7. The same pattern appeared in light-skinned faces, χ2(10, N = 105) = 132.32, p < .001.
References
Arendt, F. (2010). Cultivation effects of a newspaper on reality estimates and explicit and 
implicit attitudes. Journal of Media Psychology, 22, 147-159. doi:10.1027/1864-1105/
a000020
Arendt, F. (2012). A newspaper’s effect on the strength of automatic associations in memory. 
Journal of Media Psychology, 24, 1-8. doi:10.1027/1864-1105/a000057
Arendt, F. (2013a). Dose-dependent media priming effects of stereotypic newspaper articles 
on implicit and explicit stereotypes. Journal of Communication, 63, 830-851. doi:10.1111/
jcom.12056
Arendt, F. (2013b). News stereotypes, time, and fading priming effects. Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 90, 347-362. doi:10.1177/1077699013482907
Arendt, F. (2013c). Toward a dose-response account of media priming. Communication 
Research. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0093650213482970
Arendt, F., Steindl, N., & Vitouch, P. (2014). Effects of news stereotypes on the perception of 
facial threat. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1027/1864-1105/a000132.
814 Communication Research 44(6)
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and 
control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cogni-
tion. Vol. 1: Basic processes (2nd ed., pp. 1-40). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Berry, D., & Zebrowitz-McArthur, L. (1986). Perceiving character in faces: The impact of 
age-related craniofacial changes on social perception. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 3-18. 
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.100.1.3
Caruso, E., Mead, N., & Balcetis, E. (2009). Political partisanship influences perception of bira-
cial candidates’ skin tone. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 20168-
20173. doi:10.1073/pnas.0905362106
Chang, C. (2014). The influence of ambivalence toward a communication source: Media 
context priming and persuasion polarization. Communication Research, 41, 783-808. 
doi:10.1177/0093650213495408
Corneille, O., Hugenberg, K., & Potter, T. (2007). Applying the attractor field model to social 
cognition: Perceptual discrimination is facilitated, but memory is impaired for faces dis-
playing evaluatively congruent expressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
93, 335-352. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.335
Devine, P. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5
Dixon, T. L. (2006). Psychological reactions to crime news portrayals of Black criminals: 
Understanding the moderating roles of prior news viewing and stereotype endorsement. 
Communication Monographs, 73, 162-187. doi:10.1080/03637750600690643
Dixon, T. L. (2007). Black criminals and White officers: The effects of racially misrepresent-
ing law breakers and law defenders on television news. Media Psychology, 10, 270-291. 
doi:10.1080/15213260701375660
Dixon, T. L. (2009). “He was a Black guy”: How news’ misrepresentation of crime creates fear 
of Blacks. In R. A. Lind (Ed.), Race/gender/media: Considering diversity across audi-
ences, content, and producers (pp. 24-29). Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
Dixon, T. L., & Azocar, C. (2007). Priming crime and activating blackness: Understanding 
the psychological impact of the overrepresentation of Blacks as lawbreakers on television 
news. Journal of Communication, 57, 229-253. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00341.x
Dixon, T. L., & Linz, D. (2000). Race and the misrepresentation of victimization on local tele-
vision news. Communication Research, 27, 547-573. doi:10.1177/009365000027005001
Dixon, T. L., & Maddox, K. (2005). Skin tone, crime news, and social reality judgments: 
Priming the stereotype of the dark and dangerous black criminal. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 35, 1555-1570. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02184.x
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition. London, England: Sage.
Frisch, D., & Baron, J. (1988). Ambiguity and rationality. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 1, 149-157.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 692-731. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692
Gilliam, F., & Iyengar, S. (2000). Prime suspects: The influence of local television news on the 
viewing public. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 560-573. doi:10.2307/2669264
Grant, S. C., & Logan, G. D. (1993). The loss of repetition priming and automaticity over time 
as a function of degree of initial learning. Memory & Cognition, 21, 611-618. doi:10.3758/
BF03197193
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M., Rudman, L., Farnham, S., Nosek, B., & Mellot, D. (2002). A uni-
fied theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. Psychological 
Review, 109, 3-25. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.109.1.3
Arendt 815
Hamermesh, D., & Biddle, J. (1994). Beauty and the labor market. The American Economic 
Review, 84, 1174-1194.
Hansen, C., & Hansen, R. (1988). How rock music videos can change what is seen when boy 
meets girl: Priming stereotypic appraisal of social interactions. Sex Roles, 19, 287-316. 
doi:10.1007/BF00289839
Higgins, E. T., Bargh, J. A., & Lombardi, W. (1985). Nature of priming effects on categoriza-
tion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11, 59-69. 
doi:10.1037//0278-7393.11.1.59
Horvath, P. (2006). Wer hat Angst vorm schwarzen Mann? Der „Afrikaner” in den öster-
reichischen Medien [Who is afraid of the Black man? The “African” in Austrian mass 
media]. Medienimpulse, 57, 21-23.
Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. (2003). Facing prejudice: Implicit prejudice and the percep-
tion of facial threat. Psychological Science, 14, 640-643. doi:10.1046/j.0956-7976.2003.
psci_1478.x
Lippman, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace.
Maddox, K. (2004). Perspectives on racial phenotypicality bias. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 8, 383-401. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_4
Marsh, A., Ambady, N., & Kleck, R. (2005). The effects of fear and anger facial expressions 
on approach- and avoidance-related behaviors. Emotion, 5, 119-124. doi:10.1037/1528-
3542.5.1.119
Mastro, D. E., Behm-Morawitz, E., & Kopacz, M. A. (2008). Exposure to television portray-
als of Latinos: The implications of aversive racism and social identity theory. Human 
Communication Research, 34, 1-27. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2007.00311.x
McNamara, T. (2005). Semantic priming: Perspectives from memory and word recognition. 
New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Meltzer, C., Naab, T., & Daschmann, G. (2012). All student samples differ: On participant 
selection in communication science. Communication Methods and Measures, 6, 251-262.
Messaris, P., & Abraham, L. (2001). The role of images in framing news stories. In S. D. Reese, 
O. H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our 
understanding of the social world (pp. 215-226). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Oliver, M. B. (1999). Caucasian viewers’ memory of Black and White criminal suspects in 
the news. Journal of Communication, 49, 46-60. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02804.x
Oliver, M. B., & Fonash, D. (2002). Race and crime in the news: Whites’ identification and mis-
identification of violent and nonviolent criminal suspects. Media Psychology, 4, 137-156. 
doi:10.1207/S1532785XMEP0402_02
Oliver, M. B., Jackson, R., Moses, N., & Dangerfield, C. (2004). The face of crime: Viewers’ 
memory of race-related facial features of individuals pictured in news. Journal of 
Communication, 54, 88-104. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2004.tb02615.x
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2009). Implicit and explicit measures of attitudes: The perspective 
of the MODE model. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Brińol (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from 
the new implicit measures (pp. 19-62). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Oosterhof, N., & Todorov, A. (2008). The functional basis of face evaluation. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 11087-11092. doi:10.1073/pnas.0805664105
Park, J., Felix, K., & Lee, G. (2007). Implicit attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the mod-
erating effects of social information. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29, 35-45. 
doi:10.1080/01973530701330942
Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R., Klinger, M. R., & Roskos-Ewoldsen, B. R. (2007). Media priming: A 
meta-analysis. In R. W. Preiss, B. M. Gayle, N. Burrell, M. Allen, & J. Bryant (Eds.), Mass 
media effects research (pp. 53-80). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
816 Communication Research 44(6)
Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R., Roskos-Ewoldsen, B., & Carpentier, F. D. (2009). Media priming: An 
updated synthesis. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory 
and research (pp. 74-93). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
Ruhrmann, G., & Songül, D. (2000). Wie Medien über Migranten berichten [How the mass 
media report about migrants]. In H. Schatz, C. Holtz-Bacha, & J.-U. Nieland (Eds.), 
Migranten und Medien. Neue Herausforderungen an die Integrationsfunktion von Presse 
und Rundfunk (pp. 69-81). Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Schmidt, K., & Cohn, J. (2001). Human facial expressions as adaptations: Evolutionary 
questions in facial expression research. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology, 44, 3-24. 
doi:10.1002/ajpa.2001
Srull, T., & Wyer, R. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of informa-
tion about persons: Some determinants and implications. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37, 1660-1672. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.10.1660
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1
Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A., Goren, A., & Hall, C. (2005). Inferences of competence from 
faces predict election outcomes. Science, 308, 1623-1626. doi:10.1126/science.1110589
Uhlmann, E., Leavitt, K., Menges, J., Koopman, J., Howe, M., & Johnson, R. (2012). 
Getting explicit about the implicit: A taxonomy of implicit measures and guide for 
their use in organizational research. Organizational Research Methods, 15, 553-601. 
doi:10.1177/1094428112442750
Vergeer, M., Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2000). Exposure to newspapers and attitudes toward 
ethnic minorities: A longitudinal analysis. The Howard Journal of Communications, 11, 
127-143. doi:10.1080/106461700246661
Weber, R., & Popova, L. (2012). Testing equivalence in communication research: Theory and 
application. Communication Methods and Measures, 6, 190-213. doi:10.1080/19312458.2
012.703834
Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (1997). The flexible correction model: The role of naïve theories 
of bias in bias correction. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology 
(Vol. 29, pp. 141-208). New York, NY: Academic Press.
Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006). First impressions: Making up your mind after a 100-ms expo-
sure to a face. Psychological Science, 17, 592-598. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01750.x
Wodak, R., & Reisigl, M. (1999). Discourse and racism: European Perspectives. Annual Review 
of Anthropology, 28, 175-199. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.175
Zebrowitz, L., & McDonald, S. (1991). The impact of litigants’ babyfaceness and attractive-
ness on adjudications in small claims courts. Law and Human Behavior, 15, 603-623. 
doi:10.1007/BF01065855
Author Biography
Florian Arendt (PhD) is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Communication 
Science and Media Research, University of Munich (LMU), Germany. His primary research 
interests lie in the field of media processes and effects (keywords: priming, cultivation, implicit 
cognition, stereotyping, information processing, attitudes, behavior) and range over a variety of 
research topics such as political communication, media stereotyping, advertising, environmen-
tal communication, and health communication.
